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Geographical Indications between Trade, Development,
Culture, and Marketing: Framing a
Fair(er) System of Protection in the Global Economy?
Irene Calboli*
1 introduction
This chapter analyzes some of the topics on the current debate involving
geographical indications (GIs) of origin that will be further elaborated by
the contributors to this volume from a variety of perspectives and angles. As the
title indicates, this volume focuses on GI protection “at the crossroads of trade,
development, and culture,” with a specific focus on the countries in the Asia-
Pacific region. This choice is due primarily to the fact that the analysis of issues
related to GI protection in this region is, to date, not as extensive as the analysis
in other regions, particularly in the Western world. This volume intends to fill
this gap and aims, in particular, at analyzing the potential benefits, but also
related problems, of GI protection for local and national development in Asia-
Pacific countries. Trade- and culture-related issues, primarily issues related to
the conservation and promotion of local culture and cultural diversity, are also
central to the contributions to this volume. As the opening contribution of this
volume, this chapter then aims at setting the stage and framing the context for
other authors by offering an overview of the status of the GI debate, as well as
emphasizing some of the trends that have become salient features of this
debate in Asia-Pacific, and worldwide. These trends are, in particular, the
following: the globalization of the GI debate beyond Western countries and
beyond a “wine and cheese” agenda, or trade war, between primarily Western
* Lee Kong Chian Fellow, Visiting Professor and Deputy Director, Applied Research Centre for
Intellectual Assets and the Law in Asia, Singapore Management University School of Law;
Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. This chapter builds on my previous
publications in this area.
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interests; the increased attention for the potential benefits of GI protection by
developing countries and the often neglected attention to the potential prob-
lems associated with GI protection for local producers in these countries; and
the increasing loosening of the definition of GIs as symbols of true geographi-
cal origin in favor of a definition granting exclusive rights based on the
“historical reputation” of GIs.
Building on this premise, Section 2 starts by discussing how, after
almost a century of limited attention at the international level, GIs
have become one of the hottest topics in international intellectual
property law today. Born out of the French tradition in the nineteenth
century, and originally reserved to identify, and protect, the geographical
origin of wines against counterfeits, GI protection was later accepted by
other European countries and eventually by the European Union (EU).
Then, from Europe, GIs become a global phenomenon and a topic of
international controversy in the past two decades. In particular, GIs were
one of the hot issues at the negotiating table that led to the creation of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Discussions over GIs continued to dominate part of the WTO Doha
Development Agenda, even though WTO Members never reached any
agreement on the issue.1 Still, despite the lack of consensus at the
international level, an increasing number of countries became interested
in GIs in the following years. This interest reached beyond Western
countries. In particular, countries in Asia, Africa, and South America
have adopted, to date, national policies on GIs and taken part in the
discussion of the WTO Doha Development Agenda. In the past decade,
provisions related to GI protection have also become an important
component of bilateral and plurilateral international trade agreements
(FTAs) between countries from all continents.2 To some extent, this is
the result of the pressure exerted by the EU in its attempt to export
a pro-GI protection agenda outside Europe. But many countries have
become interested in GIs regardless of this pressure. In 2015, discussions
over GI protection also led to the adoption of the Geneva Act of the
Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their
International Registration (Geneva Act) under the auspices of the World
1 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]; World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration
of November 14, 2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter
Doha Declaration].
2 See infra Section 2.
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Intellectual Property Organization.3 Even though the Geneva Act was, at
large, the result of Western pro-GI diplomacy, it was supported by
countries outside Europe.
Moving from the international to the national level, Section 3 first reports
that several jurisdictions in Asia-Pacific have currently adopted national sui
generis systems for GI protection. These national laws are largely modelled
after the system currently adopted in the EU. Countries that have implemen-
ted sui generis systems include, to date, Japan, South Korea, Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka, Australia, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Singapore.4 Several countries in
Asia-Pacific have also established, or are discussing the establishment of
national GI registries to register both national and foreign GIs.5 Countries
that already operate national GI registries in Asia-Pacific include Cambodia,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and other countries.6 Several
of the contributors to this volume explain in detail the laws, including the
national reforms, which have been adopted in these countries. Building on
these descriptions, Section 3 focuses on the potential benefits of GIs for
socioeconomic development as well as for safeguarding national cultural
heritage in Asia-Pacific, and in general.7 However, Section 3 highlights that
GIs do not per se constitute a magic recipe, and that the long-term success of
GI products depends largely on local producers controlling and maintaining
the quality of the products, and developing savvy marketing plans. This point
is reiterated by many of the contributors to this volume, and is probably the
most important observation directed to GI producers, local and regional
communities.
3 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement on
Appellations of Origin and Geographical Indications and Regulations under the Geneva Act of
the Lisbon Agreement on Appellations of Origin and Geographical Indications, WIPO Doc.
LI/DC/19 (May 20, 2015) [hereinafter, Geneva Act]. For the original version of the Lisbon
Agreement, see Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their
International Registration, art. 2(1), October 31, 1958, as revised July 14, 2967, 923 U.N.T.S.
205 [hereinafter 1958 Lisbon Agreement].
4 See infra Section 3. 5 Id.
6 Even though GI registries are not necessary to implement sui generis GI protection, these
registries are seen today as formal tools to catalog existing GIs and promote awareness among
producers and consumers. This point is elaborated, in particular, in the chapter authored by
Naazima Kamardeen on Sri Lanka, in this volume.
7 Irene Calboli,OfMarkets, Culture, and Terroir: The Unique Economic and Culture-Related
Benefits of Geographical Indications of Origin, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 2015) [hereinafter
Calboli, The Benefits of GIs]; Tomer Broude, Taking “Trade and Culture” Seriously:
Geographical Indications and Cultural Protection in WTO Law, 26 U. PA. J. INT’L. ECON.
L. 623, 656–57, 674–79 (2005).
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Section 4 tackles one of the most problematic aspects of the GI debate,
namely the progressive loosening of the territorial linkage between GI
products and GI regions in the definition of “geographical indications.” This
section supports the point that, although this territorial linkage has never been
an absolute linkage since the first appearance of national laws regulating the
use of geographical names, the current trend seems to privilege a considerably
looser definition of GIs with respect to the actual geographical origin of the
products, their ingredients, andmanufacturing process. Hence, the traditional
basis for granting exclusive rights on GIs is precisely the territorial linkage
between the GI products and the regions – the deep connection between the
products and the land, the terroir as it is defined in the French tradition.8 In
particular, Section 4 specifically recounts that, in 1958, the text of the Lisbon
Agreement9 defined “appellations of origin” as signs identifying products
“exclusively or essentially” originating from a certain geographical region.
This definition was weakened with the adoption of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1994, which defines
GIs as “indications which identify a good as originating in the territory . . .where
a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially [no
longer exclusively] attributable to its geographical origin.”10 The TRIPS defini-
tion finds its origin in the language of the EU Regulations on GIs that were
adopted in 1992.11 In 2015, the trend of loosening the territorial linkage between
the products’ name and their actual origin was confirmed in the revision of the
Lisbon Agreement finalized in Geneva (Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement),
as the Geneva Act adopted a definition of GIs (in addition to “appellations of
origin”) that is identical to the definition in TRIPS.12
Naturally, granting exclusive rights to the name of products’ locations
facilitates the marketing of the products with famous geographical names in
the global market – i.e., Champagne sparkling wine, Parmigiano Reggiano
hard table cheese, Darjeeling tea, Kintamani coffee, or Kampot pepper. Yet,
should this exclusivity be justified when the products do not entirely originate
from the regions? Section 5 builds upon Section 4, and argues that when GIs
do not identify products that are entirely local, GIs no longer fulfill the
function for which they are legally protected – offering accurate information
about products’ geographical origin to consumers and incentivizing local
development. Instead, GIs become marketing tools to sell GI products with
8 Irene Calboli, In Territorio Veritas: Bringing Geographical Coherence in the Definition of
Geographical Indications of Origin under TRIPS, 6(1)WIPO J. 57 (2014) [hereinafter Calboli,
In Territorio Veritas].
9
1958 Lisbon Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2(1). 10 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 22(1).
11 See infra Section 4. 12 Geneva Act, supra note 3, art. 2(1)(i).
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a competitive advantage – the GI name – on the international market. In this
respect, GIs become tools that capitalize on the association between the
names and the geographical locations even when this association is based
simply on an historical reputation rather than on the accurate geographical
origin of the products. To remedy this potential distortion, or misuse of
GIs, Section 5 repeats a point that I made in my previous scholarships. In
particular, this Section argues that GI protection should be limited only to the
products that are entirely made in the GI-denominated regions.13 Certainly,
(re)creating the normative framework to implement such stricter interpreta-
tion of GIs in practice is a highly complex task that may require amending
the current definition of GIs in TRIPS – which today protects products’
“reputation” as much as the products’ actual “geographical origin.” Still,
while recognizing the challenges of amending the definition in TRIPS,
this section also proposes a more workable alternative, which could restore
“geographical accuracy” under the current international framework for GI
protection. In particular, this section suggests that GI producers disclose
directly in the GI specification, as well as on the packaging and the advertising
materials related to the products, the origin of all the ingredients, raw materi-
als, and manufacturing steps of the products that do not originate from the GI-
denominated regions. To this extent, this section turns to the language of
Article 22(2) of TRIPS, which already prohibits the use of GIs to mislead
consumers as to the origin of the products, and this provision should also apply
to GI producers.14 To date, this provision has been interpreted primarily as
prohibiting competitors from using GI names misleadingly. Yet, the provision
could (and should) apply also to GI producers and be interpreted as requiring
that GI producers disclose the actual geographical origin of the entirety of the
ingredients and manufacturing steps of products. This section concludes that
this interpretation of Article 22(2) would benefit not only consumers but also
the producers of rawmaterials and product ingredients, whose localities would
be directly recognized in the global marketplace and production chain.15 This
13 See Calboli, In Territorio Veritas, supra note 8, at 63–66.
14 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 22(2).
15 This conclusion is the result of an insightful conversation with Ms. Natalie Corthésy,
Ph.D. candidate at Queen Mary University in London and lecturer at the University of
West Indies at Mona, in December 2015. Ms. Corthésy’s research focuses on the
intellectual property protection of countries’ names. She already supported and sug-
gested a similar conclusion. Our conversation focused, in particular, on Jamaica, and
the rights of Jamaican producers in being recognized for their agricultural products in
the international market. I am grateful to Ms. Corthésy for highlighting the problems
that developing countries’ farmers face and the lack of academic discussion on this
issue so far.
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observation is of considerable relevance for developing countries, including in
Asia-Pacific, as many products from these countries, including many GI
products, are raw materials and agricultural products. These products
are often sold to and used by foreign producers for their finished products,
and rarely acknowledged in the packaging or advertising of the finished
products.
2 the global, and fragmented, discussion
on geographical indications: from france
to europe, to the world
The discussion over GIs generally brings about images of European wines,
beers, and cheeses, and with it the decade-long controversy over the names of
these products between Europeans and New World producers, primarily
producers of European immigrant origins. As other scholars and I have
recounted in detail before, this controversy sees, on the one side, the struggle
of the Europeans to prevent the New World from copying the geographical
names of EU products16 – primarily wines and cheeses – based on the argu-
ment that the New World free rides on these names and generally produces
subpar replicas compared to the original products. In the New World, this
argument is met, on the other side, with fierce resistance and the counter-
argument that European producers are trying to monopolize names that have
been used as generic terms for decades, if not centuries, in the New World by
immigrants coming from Europe.17 These two images certainly embody
sharply different points of view over the GI debate. Yet, they also shed an
important light over the historical origin of the GI controversy – one that is
tackled, from different angles, by the contributions in this volume: namely,
these images show how discussions about GIs, and the resulting controversy,
were born and have long been dominated by Western interests, literally by
16 See, e.g., the contributions in DEV GANGJEE, RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS (2016); see also the special issue of the
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 46(7) INT’L REV.
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. (2015).
17 This position is well summarized in the steady opposition to GIs by the representatives of the
Consortium for Common Food Names in the United States. See, e.g., Threats to Common
Food Names More Widespread in EU Trade Deals and Other Geographical Indications
Policies , CONSORT I UM FOR COMMON FOOD NAME S (March 19 , 2015), www
.commonfoodnames.com/threats-to-common-food-names-more-widespread-in-eu-trade-deals
-and-other-geographical-indications-policies/ (stating the actions taken in several countries to
protect common food names such as “parmesan,” “feta,” and “bologna”) [hereinafter
CONSORTIUM FOR COMMON FOOD NAMES].
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a “wine and cheese war” between the Old and New Worlds.18 Western
interests were clearly at the basis, and at the negotiating table, when the
GI provisions in TRIPS were discussed and finalized in the early 1990s,
even as the EU was the main proponent of GI protection and New
World Western countries were the main opponents. Hence, despite the
lack of overall agreement on the issue, both worlds agree on enhanced
protection for wines and spirits19 – since both (Western) worlds had, and
have, important interests in wines and spirits, as the main producers and
exporters of these products.20 To the contrary, both worlds could not find
a common solution with respect to the protection of the names for cheeses
primarily due to the resistance of national dairy industries. Several decades
after the conclusion of TRIPS, the “cheese war” betweenOld andNewWorlds
still rages on.
In the past decades, however, discussions about GIs have expanded
beyond the West and reached the attention of other continents and devel-
oping countries. Notably, many countries in Asia, Africa, Central America,
and South America have expressed interest in GI protection and, as a result,
have implemented or are considering implementing specific provisions to
protect GIs, including registration-based sui generis systems.21 In this
respect, it should be noted that several famous GI-denominated products
come today from non-Western countries – Darjeeling tea, Ceylon tea,
Kampot pepper, Kobe beef, and Blue Mountain coffee are just a few
examples of famous non-Western GI products. Contributors to this volume
address in detail several of the national initiatives to protect GIs, particularly
with respect to the Asia-Pacific region, and elaborate on the legislative
history, and where possible the practical application, of these laws.
Additional evidence of the increasing interests by non-Western countries
in the GI debate is shown by the fact that discussions over GI protection are
no longer just about “wine and cheese” or agricultural and food-related
products – the latter also part of the GI agenda of Western countries.
18 To date, the “wine” part of this war has been largely resolved with ad hoc wine agreements
between Western countries. See Agreement Between the European Community and the
United States of America on Trade in Wine, E.C.-U.S., March 10, 2006, 2006 O.J. (L 87) 2
(EC), http://ttb.gov/agreements/us-eu-wine-agreement.pdf. The EU has concluded similar
“Wine Agreements,” inter alia, with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. See
Irene Calboli, Time to Say Local Cheese and Smile at Geographical Indications?
International Trade and Local Development in the United States, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 373,
396–97 (2015) [hereinafter Calboli, Say Local Cheese].
19 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 23. 20 Calboli, Say Local Cheese, supra note 18, at 384.
21 An updated list of national laws on GIs can be found in the database of WIPO. SeeWIPO Lex,
www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/ (last visited August 22, 2016).
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Instead, discussions on GI protection now encompass proposals for expand-
ing protection beyond agricultural products, foodstuffs, wines, and spirits in
those countries that still limit protection to these products.22 Several coun-
tries in Asia-Pacific, for example, have long offered protection as GIs to
handicrafts and artisanal products beyond agricultural products and food
stuff, and have promoted the expansion of protectable subject matter to
encompass these products internationally.23 Along the same lines, many
non-Western pro-GI countries are promoting, along with Western pro-GI
countries such as the EU, the adoption of the higher level of protection
currently provided by TRIPS to wines and spirits for all GIs, again because
this protection may better suit their national interests in international trade
by offering the possibility to protect the names of their products also in the
foreign countries where the products are exported and sold to.24
Still, even though discussions about GIs – more precisely discussions for
and against GI protection – have certainly gone global today, it is important to
remember that the modern system of GI protection originates from Europe
and, more specifically, from the French laws protecting appellations of origin
in the early twentieth century.25 Remembering this fact is relevant both to
better understand the development of the international movements support-
ing GI protection and to identify solutions to limiting a possibly excessive
expansion of GI protection beyond the economic and normative reasons that
were originally at the basis of this protection.
In particular, the origin of GI protection can be traced back to the
attempts to prevent fraud in the marketplace for wines in France following
the dramatic destruction of French vineyards by a pandemic of phylloxera
in the late 1800s. Due to the pest, the production of French wine consider-
ably diminished,26 and this led to widespread counterfeits and adulterated
products.27 To counter this, France enacted a wine labeling law in
1905 prohibiting the misuse of wine names.28 This law was revised in
22 See discussion infra Section 3.
23 See, e.g., Delphine Marie-Vivien, A Comparative Analysis of GIs for Handicrafts: The Link to
Origin in Culture as Well as Nature? in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS 292 (Dev Gangjee ed., 2016).
24 Id.
25 For one of the most detailed reconstructions of the history and development of GI protection,
see Dev Gangjee, RELOCATING THE LAW OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS 93–96 (2012)
[hereinafter Gangjee, RELOCATING GIS].
26 Id. at 93–94. 27 Id. at 94–95.
28 Loi du 1er Août 1905 sur les Fraudes et Falsı́fications en Matière des Produits ou de Services,
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE],
August 5, 1905, p. 4813.
10 Irene Calboli
1919,29 and later in 1935.30 Still, the adoption of the French laws in the
early twentieth century was prompted primarily by the necessity to
prevent unfair competition in the marketplace by unrelated parties
using geographical names inaccurately while also securing the
accuracy of the information about products’ geographical origin for
consumers.
To justify the protection of geographical names, however, the French laws
enshrined into the normative framework of protection the notion that loca-
tion, and more precisely the terroir – a deep connection between the products
and the land, as mentioned in the Introduction – where the vine was grown and
the wines were made, was a “key ingredient in differentiating between wines by
indicating a distinct origin.”31 This notion represented a considerable step
forward in explicitly protecting “geographical origin” from the previously existing
laws on unfair competition and, above all, the protection granted to “indications
of origin” in the 1883 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.32
Since then, the notion of terroir has been at the heart of the policy justifications
for protecting GIs, including the basis of the argument that GIs are incentive for
local and rural development due to the fact that they promote local products.
To be precise, the 1891 Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False and
Deceptive Indications of Source on Goods (the Madrid Agreement),33 which
predated the French Law of 1905 by a few years, already included a similar
notion – the protection of “regional appellations concerning the source of the
products of the vine.”34Yet, French negotiators certainly influenced the language
of the agreement. In 1958, the notion of terroir was then confirmed in the Lisbon
Agreement, whose imprint from the French laws also cannot be overstated.
Certainly the most comprehensive system of protection for appellations of
origin adopted at the international level, the Lisbon Agreement also included
29 Loi du 6 Mai 1919 Relative à la Protection des Appelations d’Origine, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE
LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], May 8, 1919, p. 4726.
30 Décret-loi du 30 Juillet 1935 Relatif à la Défense du Marché du Vins et au Régime
Economique de l’alcool, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 31, 1935, p. 8314 (creating a system based on controlled
appellations of origin).
31
GANGJEE, RELOCATING GIS, supra note 25, at 83.
32 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, March 20, 1883, as revised July 14,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, arts. 10(1) and 10bis [hereinafter Paris Convention],
forbidding “false, fictitious, or deceptive trade names,” and the use of any misleading indica-
tions (but not specifically geographical indications).
33 Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False andDeceptive Indications of Source onGoods,
April 14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Madrid Agreement].
34 Madrid Agreement, supra note 33, art. 2.
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a system of international registration. However, both the Lisbon Agreement and
the Madrid Agreement had few signatories and the majority were countries
from Europe.35 In May 2015, a revised text of the Lisbon Agreement was
adopted after a Diplomatic Conference held in Geneva. Supporters of the
Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement hoped that the new agreement may
facilitate a membership increase.36To date, for example, several countries in
Asia-Pacific are evaluating the feasibility of joining the revised Lisbon
Agreement and the international registration system. Still, the Geneva Act
was adopted amidst many controversies and it may not achieve the success
hoped for by its proponents.
Ultimately it was only in 1994, with the adoption of TRIPS, that GIs really
entered the international stage on a full scale since all WTO Members had
to include a minimum-level GI protection in their national laws as part of
the obligations established by TRIPS.37 The same obligation applied to the
countries that joined the WTO after 1994, many of which were countries
from the Asia-Pacific region.38 Still, non-Western countries were, at large,
not active parts in negotiating these provisions, even though several of these
countries participated in subsequent negotiations related to the advance-
ment of TRIPS’ built-in GI agenda.39 In particular, TRIPS established
a double system of protection: a “floor level” of protection for all GIs against
misleading and unfair competition-based uses of GIs;40 and an enhanced
level of protection for GIs identifying wines and spirits against usurpation of
the GI names, including when “the true origin of the goods is indicated or
the [GI] is used in translation or accompanied by expression such as ‘kind’,
‘type’, ‘style’, ‘imitation’, or the like.”41 TRIPS also established several
35 As of March 2017, only twenty-eight States are contracting parties to the 1958 Lisbon
Agreement, and twenty-seven States are signatories of the 1967 Stockholm Revisions. See
Contracting Parties, Madrid Agreement,WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., www.wipo.int/treaties/
en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=3. Only thirty-six States are contracting parties of the
Madrid Agreement. See Contracting Parties, Lisbon Agreement and Contracting Parties,
Stockholm Act, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., www.wipo.int/treaties/en/registration/lisbon/.
36 As of March 2017, only fifteen States have signed the Geneva Act. See Contracting Parties,
Geneva Act, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., www.wipo.int/treaties/en/registration/lisbon/.
37 TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 22–24.
38 For the alphabetical list of the countries that are members of the WTO, which also indicates
the date in which the countries joined the WTO, see Members and Observers,WORLD TRADE
ORG., www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.
39 For a background to the current debate at the WTO, and the respective proposal by various
groups of countries, see TRIPS: Geographical Indications, Background and the Current
Situation, WORLD TRADE ORG., www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/gi_background_e
.htm#wines_spirits.
40 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 22(2). 41 Id. art. 23.
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limitations to GI protection as a result of the requests of anti-GI advocates.
These include provisions on generic terms and the possibility of “grand-
fathering” existing rights for trademarks that were in use or had been
registered in good faith before the date of the implementation of TRIPS
in the WTOMember States where the mark was registered, or before the GI
was protected in its country of origin.42
Nevertheless, the GI provisions in TRIPS did not fully satisfy the requests
of the pro-GI countries, which managed to include into TRIPS the com-
mitment to continue the negotiation – in the form of a built-in agenda
mandating further negotiations on GIs.43 In particular, TRIPS binds WTO
Members to hold future negotiations in order to (a) discuss the creation of
a multilateral system of notification and registration of GIs (similar to the
one already in force under the Lisbon Agreement) for wines and spirits44
and (b) “to enter into negotiations aimed at increasing the protection of
individual geographical indications [to the level of GIs for wines and
spirits].”45 Because of the delay in pursuing these negotiations – due
again to the opposition of anti-GI countries – GI protection was also
included in the agenda for discussion in the Doha “Development” Round
of WTO negotiations in 2001.46 The Doha version of the WTO GI agenda
included again the creation of a multilateral register, no longer just for
wines and spirits, but for all GIs, and the possibility of extending the higher
level of protection provided to wines and spirits to all GIs.47 However, no
agreement on any of these issues could be reached when WTO Members
met in 2003 in Cancun, Mexico.48 As a result, multilateral negotiations on
GIs have been stalled ever since, and more than a decade after the meeting
42 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 24(4)–(5). The multinational controversies over several names
such as Feta, Fontina, Asiago, and Parmesan as well as the litigation for the rights to the
GI (or mark) “Budweiser” across several countries are some of the most famous examples
of potential national divergences, and in turn (legal) conflict, regarding the relationship
between GIs and, respectively, generic names and registered marks. See CONSORTIUM
FOR COMMON FOOD NAMES, supra note 17; Christopher Heath, The Budweiser Cases:
A Brewing Conflict, in LANDMARK INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES AND THEIR LEGACY
181 (Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2011).
43 TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 23(4), 24(1). 44 Id. art. 23(4). 45 Id. art. 24(1).
46 See Doha Declaration, supra note 1. For a detailed analysis of the Doha Declaration, see
TRIPs: Issues, Geographical Indications, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://wto.org/english/tra
top_e/trips_e/gi_e.htm (last visited August 22, 2016).
47 See Doha Declaration, supra note 1, 18.
48 For more details about the WTO negotiations in Cancun, see TRIPS: Geographical
Indications, Background and the Current Situation, WORLD TRADE ORG., www.wto.org/e
nglish/tratop_e/trips_e/gi_background_e.htm (last visited August 22, 2016).
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in Cancun and two decades since the adoption of TRIPS, there is no sign
that WTO countries may restart negotiations on the TRIPS’ built-in GI
agenda any time soon.49
Because of this impasse, discussions about GIs have continued primarily as
part of FTA negotiations in recent years. Several of these FTAs, and the resulting
“FTA maze,” are addressed at length in this volume, from the perspectives of
both pro-GI and GI-skeptic countries. In a nutshell, pro-GI countries, led by the
EU, seem to have been particularly successful in advancing their GI protection
agenda as part of the FTA strategy. For example, the EU has negotiated the
protection of a long list of EUGIs, including the “claw back” of several terms that
are protected as GIs in the EU and were considered generic terms in the
jurisdictions of several negotiating parties, in the EU–Canada Comprehensive
Trade Agreement,50 and in the FTAs concluded with Korea, Vietnam, and
several South American countries.51 To date, EU negotiators are continuing to
press the EU GI agenda in trade talks with, inter alia, India, Japan, Malaysia,
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.52 The EU is also discussing the
extension of its previous stand-alone agreement on GIs with China, through
which both the EU and China had registered ten GIs from the other parties in
their national, or regional for the EU, jurisdictions.53 Considering the impor-
tance of China, and Asia, as the export destination for EU products, these results
are certainly good news for the EU. To counter the EU strategy, GI-skeptic
countries have also engaged in trade negotiations, including GI provisions. This
has been the case primarily with the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was
49 SeeWORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Article 27.3b, Traditional Knowledge, Biodiversity, WTO
Doc. TN/C/W/61 (April 21, 2011), www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/art27_3b_e.htm.
Status of Play – Delegations continued to voice the divergent views that have character-
ized this debate, with no convergence evident on the specific question of extension of
Article 23 coverage: some Members continued to argue for extension of Article 23
protection to all products; others maintained that this was undesirable and created
unreasonable burdens.
Id. at 4.
50 See Comprehensive Trade and Economic Agreement, Can.-EU, Consolidated CETA Text,
ch. 22, art. 7, Intellectual Property, September 26, 2014, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/
2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf [hereinafter CETA, Intellectual Property Chapter]. See
Calboli, Say Local Cheese, supra note 18, at 408–18 (discussing the EU’s strategy as part of
CETA and suggesting a compromising solution for the TTIP negotiations).
51 For details on the FTAs concluded by the EU and other countries, or currently under
negotiation, see European Commission’s Trade Policy Portal, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec
.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/intellectual-property/geographical-indications/
(last visited August 22, 2016).
52 Id.
53 See Geographical Indications (GI), EU-CHINA TRADE PROJECT (II), www.euctp.org/index
.php/en/agriculture-food-safety/geographical-indications-gi.html (last visited August 22, 2016).
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finalized in 2015, and includes provisions related to “generic terms” and regis-
teredmarks thatmay be protected asGIs in other countries.54 Still, because of the
diverging interests of various TPP members, the final draft of the TPP leaves
signatories free to negotiate different provisions in other FTAs, subject only to
minimum requirements55 – again a partial victory for pro-GI advocates.
Moreover, the United States officially withdrew from the TPP in January 2017,
and the agreement may never be ratified by the remaining parties.56
3 the potential benefits, promises, and problems
of geographical indications for economic and social
development
As indicated in Section 2, besides being one of the most relevant topics
of discussion in international trade today, the benefits derived by adopting a
national system of GI protection have been discussed also at the national level
in a growing number of countries. In particular, GI-related legislations have
recently been adopted or updated in several countries, including in Asia-
Pacific, as detailed by the chapters in this volume. Notably, new or updated
laws have been recently adopted, inter alia, in Japan,57 Bangladesh,58
Singapore,59 Indonesia,60 and Cambodia.61 In other countries, such as Sri
54 See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, ch. 18, arts. 18.30–36 Intellectual Property,
October 5, 2015, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Intellectual-Property
.pdf [hereinafter TPP]. When the TPP was finalized, the TPP members were Australia,
Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,
Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam. But the United States withdrew from the
TPP in early 2017. See infra n.56.
55 Id. art. 18.36. Several TPPmembers – Vietnam,Malaysia, and Singapore – have concluded, or
are discussing, FTAs with the EU.
56 See Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR), The United States Officially
Withdraws from the Transpacific-Partnership, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-
office/press-releases/2017/january/US-Withdraws-From-TPP. (last visited 1 February 2017).
57 Tokutei Norin Suisan Butsu to no Meisho no Hogo ni Kansuru Horitsu [Act for the
Protection of the Names of Designated Agricultural, Forestry and Fishery Products and
Foodstuffs], June 25, 2014, available at, www.maff.go.jp/j/shokusan/gi_act/outline/pdf/do
c4.pdf. (last visited August 22, 2016).
58 The Geographical Indication (Registration and Protection) Act of 2013 (Bangl.).
59 Geographical Indications Act, No. 19 of 2014 (Sing.), not yet in force.When this Act enters into
force, it will replace the Geographical Indications Act (Cap 117B, 1999 rev edn.) (Sing.).
60 See Law No. 20 of October 27, 2016, concerning Trade Marks and Geographical Indications
amending Law No. 15of 2001 concerning Trade Marks (Indonesia).
61 The Law on Geographical Indications of Goods (“GI Law”) of Cambodia entered into force
on January 20, 2014. See ProtectedGeographical Indications in Cambodia,AGENCE FRANCAISE
DE DEVELOPPEMENT, www.afd.fr/webdav/shared/PORTAILS/PAYS/CAMBODGE_2/PDF/
Brochure%20GI%20-%20Cambodia%20-%20EN.pdf (last visited August 22, 2016).
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Lanka,62 Australia,63 and New Zealand,64 among others, legislative reforms
about the current status of GI protection are pending or being discussed.
In this respect, it is important to note that these reforms are also taking place
in countries that have traditionally been skeptical of GI protection, such as
Australia, which is currently debating a possible extension of GI protection for
wines to other agricultural products.65 A similar discussion may soon start in
New Zealand, a country that is currently considering a bill to implement more
detailed requirements and clarification for the current level of GI protection
to wines. As mentioned earlier, the growing participation of Asia and non-
Western countries in discussions on GIs also brought more attention to the
request of expanding GI protection to nonagricultural products, namely
handicrafts and artisanal goods, such as wood-carved and pottery products,
textiles, and so forth. Developing countries are large producers of these
products and seek their protection not only at the national level but also
internationally. For example, pressure from developing countries (in
exchange of protection for EU GIs in their jurisdictions) is certainly part
of the reasons why the EU is now considering expanding GI protection
beyond agriculture-based products,66 and the proposal for a new Regulation
in this respect has already received the unanimous approval of the EU
Parliament.67
62 Intellectual Property Act, No. 36 of 2003, § 160 (Sri Lanka); Consumer Affairs Authority Act,
No.9 of 2003, § 30 (Sri Lanka).
63 Wine Australia Corporation Act of 1980; Australian Grape and Wine Authority Act of 2013.
64 Fair Trading Act of 1986 (N. Z.).
65 See WILLIAM VAN CAENEGEM, JEN A. CLEARY & PETER DRAHOS, PROVENANCE OF
AUSTRALIAN FOOD PRODUCTS: IS THERE A PLACE FOR GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS?
(2015), available at https://rirdc.infoservices.com.au/items/15–060; William Van Caenegem,
Jen A. Cleary, & Peter Drahos, Pride and Profit: Geographical Indications as Regional
Development Tools in Australia, 16 J. ECON. & SOC. POL’Y (2014), available at http://epubs
.scu.edu.au/jesp/vol16/iss1/5/.
66 In 2015, the European Commission published a report evaluating the opportunity to extend
GI protection for nonagricultural products. See Results of the Public Consultation and
Public Conference on Making the Most Out of Europe’s Traditional Know-How: A Possible
Extension of Geographical Indication Protection of the European Union to Non-
Agricultural Products, at 36–37, COM (2014) 469 final (January 20, 2015), http://ec.europa
.eu/docsroom/documents/10565/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/pdf. This report
followed a study commissioned by the EU Commission. See Insight Consulting et al.,
Study on Geographical Indications Protection for Non-Agricultural Products in the Internal
Market (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/geo-indications/130322_
geo-indications-non-agri-study_en.pdf.
67 On September 22, 2015, the European Parliament considered the protection of nonagri-
cultural GIs and called “on the Commission to propose without delay a legislative proposal
with the aim of establishing a single European system of protection of geographical
indications for non-agricultural products.” Comm. on Legal Affairs, Report on the
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Certainly, the rise in attention to GIs is again, at least with respect to some
countries, the direct effect of FTA negotiations, particularly with the EU.
This is the case, for example, of Singapore, a country with no national GIs,
which has updated the existing law and adopted a registration-based system
of GI protection as part of the obligations undertaken under the EU-
Singapore FTA.68 Other countries, however, already had comprehensive
national GI regulations well before negotiating FTAs – this is the case of
Vietnam, for instance, a country with a long-standing tradition of GI
protection before the EU-Vietnam FTA.69 Still, several of the countries,
in Asia-Pacific (and elsewhere), that decided to implement a sui generis
system of protection, including a registration system, may have done this
under the indirect influence from the EU, because of previous colonial ties,
or in order to imitate the EU system as a proven successful system in this
area when they had to implement the minimum standards of protection
mandated under TRIPS. This may be the case of countries such as
Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, and Thailand among
others. All these countries have a registration-based system for GI protection
today. In certain instances, several countries in Asia-Pacific seem also to
have been influenced by successful experiences of neighboring countries in
this respect. For example, it cannot be excluded that, once India imple-
mented a system of GI protection, this triggered discussions about adopting
a similar protection in neighboring countries.70 Presently, several of the
member countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
are also stepping up their GI protection based both on a variety of FTA
negotiations in the region and the example of successful GI experiences,
such as those in Thailand and Vietnam.
In general, this renewed attention to GIs is driven primarily by the belief
(or the hope) that GI protection can, or at least may, benefit the national
Possible Extension of Geographical Indication Protection of the European Union to Non-
Agricultural Products, EU Doc. A8-0259/2015, at 6/26, ¶ 3 (2015), www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A8-2015–0259+0+DOC+PDF+
V0//EN.
68 See Geographical Indications Act, No. 19 of 2014 (Sing.). See also EU-Singapore Free Trade
Agreement, EU-Sing., September 20, 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/countries/singapore/.
69 Civil Code of Vietnam (1995), art. 786 (Vietnam). In 2015, the EU and Vietnam concluded
the EU-Vietnam FTA. See EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement: Agreed Text as of January 2016,
EUR. COMM’N, February 1, 2016, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437.
70 This is the case of Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, for example, following the adoption of GI
protection in India. See the chapters by Naazima Kamardeen and Mahua Zauhr in this
volume.
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economies of the countries adopting these laws. Several of the contributions to
this volume discuss the potential benefits, but also the possible pitfalls, of GI
protection in several countries in Asia-Pacific.
In particular, as I have recounted before, one of the staple arguments in
support of GI protection – in Europe, Asia, and worldwide – is precisely the
proposition that granting exclusive rights on geographical names associated
to products coming from certain regions would translate into incentivizing
and promoting local and rural development in those regions.71 This argu-
ment rests on the consideration that groups of regional producers would be
motivated to start investing, or continue to invest, in the production of
certain types of products that traditionally originate from a given region, if
they can secure exclusive rights on the geographical names of that region.
This is because, in the view of the producers, obtaining exclusive rights on
the GIs would guarantee the ability to capture the full profit for the quality
and characteristics of the products, including the added value that the GIs
could give to the products – e.g., the fact that consumers locally, nationally,
or internationally may be willing to pay a premium price for sparkling wine
from Champagne, tea from Darjeeling, and pepper from Kampot.
Hence, in order to secure these exclusive rights, collectivities of regional
producers should work together to identify a common process that defines the
uniqueness of the GI products, and submit the products’ specification with the
application to register the GI. Producers should also identify quality control
bodies, both internal and external, to certify the conforming of the products to
the specification.72 Once the GI is registered, the collectivity of producers
(which generally also remain competitors in the intra GI market) is bound by
71 See Calboli, The Benefits of GIs, supra note 7, at 447–52 (summarizing the economic argu-
ments in favor of GI protection); see also GANGJEE, RELOCATING GIS, supra note 25, at 183
(noting that GIs are protected due to the possibility to “generate improved incomes and
tangible benefits for groups of rural or marginalized groups”). See also, e.g., Sarah Bowen,
Embedding Local Places in Global Spaces: Geographical Indications as a Territorial
Development Strategy, 75 RURAL SOC. 209 (2010); GIOVANNI BELLETTI & ANDREA
MARESCOTTI, GI SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 15 (2006), available at www.origin-food
.org/2005/upload/SIN%20-%20WP2%20FinalReport%20DEF.pdf.
72 This is a very important step in the process of GI registration, which traditionally sees the
involvement of the state, as a certifying public authority, and the selection of private, yet
independent, bodies for quality control. For example, the quality control body for the GI
Parmigiano Reggiano is the Organismo di Controllo Qualità Produzioni Regolamentate. See
ORGANISMO DI CONTROLLO QUALITA` PRODUZIONI REGOLAMENTATE [Organism for Quality
Control of Regulated Productions], www.ocqpr.it/ (last visited August 22, 2016). The quality
control body for the GI Prosciutto di Parma is Istituto Parma Qualità. See ISTITUTO PARMA
QUALITA` [Institute Parma Quality], www.parmaqualita.it/ (last visited August 22, 2016).
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the specification, and this guarantees the consistency of the quality and char-
acteristics that consumers expect to find in all GI-denominated products.73
In other words, GIs facilitate not only local development by tying producers
to the land, but also producers’ cooperation to maintain the quality of the
products for the collectivity. Overall, the impact of GI protection on develop-
ment continues to strengthen when GI-denominated products become estab-
lished in the marketplace, as GIs incentivize the producers to continue to
invest in the quality of the products.74Moreover, since the land is the essential
wealth, the heart, upon which the fortune of the GI producers is constructed,
GIs also function as incentives for producers to adopt long-term strategies for
safeguarding and enhancing the well-being of the land. In particular, GI
producers are aware that the long-term health of the land and the resources
of the region are crucial for the long-term success of GI products and generally
work together to maintain the well-beingness of the region. Besides benefitting
GI producers, this can have positive spillover on the region landscapes and in
turn several other industries built around the GI products – for example,
a variety of service providers, the tourism industry, including eco-tourism,
and regional retailer of GI products and the producers of products that can
accompany the sale of GI products.
Moreover, whereas GIs permit producers to capture the added value of GI
products, GIs also operate as “badges of accountability” for those producers
who decide to produce subpar products or simply not respect the requirements
listed in the GI specification. In particular, under the current normative
framework of GI protection, these producers will be forbidden from using
the GI unless they return to producing following the mandated standards.
In light of this possibility, the importance of quality control on GI products
cannot be overstated. In this respect, several countries in Asia-Pacific
have recently implemented or have revamped the systems of quality control
73 For example, all European GIs for agricultural products and food stuff are registered in the
online database “DOOR.” See DOOR, Denomination Information, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec
.europa.eu/agriculture/quality/door/list.html (last visited August 22, 2016). Moreover, the
websites of many registered PDOs and PGIs indicate the specifications and quality control
related to the products.
74 See GANGJEE, RELOCATING GIS, supra note 25, at 266 (“Since consumers are willing to pay
more for such goods, this encourages farmers to invest in making the transition from produ-
cing un-differentiated bulk commodities, towards producing higher quality niche products”).
See alsoMichelle Agdomar,Removing the Greek from Feta and Adding Korbel to Champagne:
The Paradox of Geographical Indications in International Law, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDI & ENT. L.J. 541, 586–87 (2008) (noting that granting property rights through geogra-
phical indications allows producers to control the quality of their goods in order to build
consumer confidence).
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of GI-denominated products in order to effectively ensure that the products
comply with the product specifications.75
The second argument in support of GI protection is that GIs provide
consumers with relevant information about the GI products.76 In particular,
from a public policy standpoint, GIs offer to consumers, including retailers
purchasing GI-denominated products for resale, information that can reduce
the information asymmetries that consumers usually face compared to produ-
cers at the time of purchase. In other words, GIs offer additional information
about the quality and characteristics of the products, and this offers consumers
the possibility to make a better-informed decision about their purchase.77 GIs
can also offer relevant information about the safety and the health of the
products because they offer information about the origin and the practices that
go into making the products.78 Similarly, GIs can provide information about
the impact of the manufacturing and other practices used to produce the
GI-denominated products on the environment, and even labor practices,
including overall human rights. Again, this set of information could assist
consumers in identifying potentially healthier foods for their individual needs,
or artifacts made with traditional or environmentally friendly manufacturing
techniques for those countries that provide GI protection beyond food-related
products. As mentioned earlier, GIs can even reduce possible “contagion
effects” due to negative incidents in a given geographical market for
a certain type of product.79 This was the case, for example, with respect
to the scandal of the contaminated “mozzarella di bufala campana,” a GI-
denominated product from Italy.80 In this case, consumers could use the
information provided by the GI to know that they should avoid the products
75 See, e.g., Trong Binh Vu & Duc Huan Dao, Geographical Indication and Appellation of
Origin in Vietnam: Reality, Policy, and Perspective, INSTITUTE OF POLICY AND STRATEGY
FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT – MISPA PROJECT (2006), available at www
.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/olq/documents/documents/GI%20and%20AO%20in%20Viet
nam.pdf [hereinafter, Binh & Huan, GI and Appellation of Origin]; see also
Chuthaporn Ngokkuken & Ulrike Grote, Challenges and Opportunities for Protecting
Geographical Indications in Thailand, 19 ASIA-PAC. DEV. J. 93 (2012).
76 SeeCalboli, The Benefits of GIs, supra note 7, at 435;GANGJEE, RELOCATING GIS, supra note
25, at 183 (GIs are protected because they “must actually provide useful information to
consumers in an established market”).
77 Agdomar, supra note 74, at 586–87 (noting that GIs constitute methods of improving asym-
metrical information as they signal quality and expertise and enable consumers to distinguish
between premium-quality products and low-end products).
78 Id. at 587–88. 79 See Calboli, The Benefits of GIs, supra note 7, at 447–52.
80 See Michael McCarthy & John Phillips, Italy’s Toxic Waste Crisis, the Mafia – and the




originating in the affected region, while they could safely continue to purchase
the generic product “mozzarella di bufala” from other regions.
In addition to the arguments that GI promotes economic development and
reduces information asymmetries from consumers, another argument has
been brought forward in recent years to justify GI protection. This argument
is directly addressed by several contributions in this volume and centers on the
proposition that GIs can protect the cultural identity of local and regional
communities, which in turn may contribute to promoting cultural diversity.81
The growing importance of GIs under the lenses of culture-related concerns
finds additional support in two separate conventions that have been recently
adopted under the patronage of the United Nation Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO): the 2003 Convention for the
Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage82 and the 2005 Convention
on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.83
Under the UNESCO framework, GIs seem well suited for the protection of
culture-based interests because GI products frequently relate to local and
traditional knowledge of the region where the products are made.84 Thus,
granting exclusive rights to GIs could serve to promote the continuation of
traditional manufacturing techniques, which could otherwise succumb to the
competition of mass production techniques. Moreover, GIs directly contri-
bute to reinforcing local identities by again promoting the making and selling
of local products. As others and I have suggested, this may promote greater
product diversity in an economy where products would be otherwise increas-
ingly similar due to the globalization of trade and the de-localization of
product manufacturing.85
81 In this respect, see Calboli, The Benefits of GIs, supra note 7, at 439; see also, e.g.,
Toshiyuki Kono, Geographical Indication and Intangible Cultural Heritage, in LE
INDICAZIONI DI QUALITA` DEGLI ALIMENTI 289 (Benedetta Ubertazzi & Esther
Muñiz Espada eds., 2009); Tomer Broude, A Diet Too Far? Intangible Cultural Heritage,
Cultural Diversity, and Culinary Practices, in DIVERSITY IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: IDENTITIES, INTERESTS, AND INTERSECTIONS 472 (Irene Calboli &
Srividhya Ragavan eds., 2015).
82 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, October 17, 2003, in
force April 20, 2006, 2368 U.N.T.S. 1, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/00
1325/132540e.pdf.
83 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,
October 20, 2005, 2440 U.N.T.S. 346 available at http://en.unesco.org/creativity/sites/creativ
ity/files/passeport-convention2005-web2.pdf.
84 See, e.g., Teshager W. Dagne, Harnessing the Development Potential of Geographical
Indications for Traditional Knowledge-based Agricultural Products, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L &
PRAC. 441, 447 (2010).
85 SeeCalboli, The Benefits of GIs, supra note 7, at 439; Dev Gangjee,Geographical Indications
and Cultural Heritage, 4 WIPO J. 92, 99 (2012).
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Hence, as Justin Hughes pointedly observes in this volume, for all their
potential benefits for local development and culture, GIs are not a magic
recipe for success for local producers. Instead, several of the GIs that have
been registered in the EU, and elsewhere, to date, have not brought to their
producers more than some modest returns and, at times, the same returns as
non-GI products. This has been proven true, in particular, with respect to
raw materials and non-processed agricultural products.86 As a result, this
partially questions the value of GIs for these products. In turn, this raises
question about the value of GI protection for developing countries, as many
of the GIs registered and protected in these countries are for raw materials
and non-processed agricultural products. Moreover, developing countries
often lack the infrastructure to enact strict quality control programs, and
appropriate marketing of the products. Similarly, foreign enterprises are
often deeply involved in the management of GIs in developing countries,
which may lead to their business interests prevailing over long-term local
(and thus national) development.87 This could become problematic for
local communities, particularly when foreign businesses push for excessive
production and fast-paced growth of the products’ quantities.88 More gen-
erally, the success of any GI products can become a double-edged sword
and lead to inconsiderate exploitation of the land and natural resources
without proper management of the GIs and a long-term strategic plan for
the growth and development of the products. In turn, this could directly
and negatively affect the local environment, and overall the sustainability
of the production of the GI products themselves. A telling example in Asia-
Pacific is the case of “Phu Quoc,” which was registered as a GI for fish
sauces in Vietnam in 2001. After obtaining the GI registration, national
(and foreign) producers overproduced without implementing a rigorous
system of quality control for the products for several years. This led to
unwelcome results for the local environment, and the simultaneous rise of
counterfeits.89Only recently, a control body for the Phu Quoc products was
established and the body has stepped up in controlling the quality and
authenticity of the products.
86
ARETÉ, STUDY ON ASSESSING THE ADDED VALUE OF PDO/PGI (2013), http://ec.europa.eu/
agriculture/external-studies/2013/added-value-pdo-pgi/exec-sum_en.pdf.
87 See Bowen, supra note 71.
88 See, e.g. Jennifer Barnette,Geographic Indications as a Tool to Promote Sustainability? Café de
Colombia and Tequila Compared, 39 ECOLOGY L. Q. 102 (2012).
89 For a detailed discussion on the “Phu Quoc” registration process, see Binh & Huan, GI and
Appellation of Origin, supra note 75.
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4 TERROIR with less TERROIR? the rise
of “reputation-based” geographical indications, the
loosening territorial linkage, and risks thereof
This section argues that GI protection becomes more questionable when the
products do not entirely originate from the GI regions and GI producers use
a partially de-localized production model for their products. Unfortunately,
despite the claims of “geographical purity” supported by pro-GI advocates, this
partially delocalized model of production for GI products seems today to be
more the norm than the exception, with the blessing of international law and
most national laws onGIs. Hence, whenGIs do not identify fully locally made
products, GI protection can easily transform in subsidies and thus confirm the
concerns that are often expressed by GI skeptics. In essence, as I argued in my
previous scholarship, granting exclusive rights when GIs do not identify fully
locally made products risks to transform GIs into a marketing tool rather than
signs of the accurate geographical origin of the products at issue.90 This, in my
opinion, seems to run against the very rationale for protecting GIs in the first
place – the linkage between the products and the land, in other words the
commonly celebrated unique relationship between the products and the
terroir.
Certainly, it should be noted that the relationship between the terroir and
the products originating from the land has been partially romanticized.
In particular, this relationship was never absolute and overly strict, despite
the (often conveniently painted) arguments of GI supporters. This was
already the case with respect to the first laws on GIs – or, more precisely,
their predecessors “indications” and “appellations” of origin – in the legal
landscape. Yet, as mentioned in Section 2, starting with the French laws of
the early 1900s, and a few years prior with theMadrid Agreement, it is accurate
to say that the broad justification for protecting indications of geographical
origin was enshrined in the notion that these indications deserved separate
protection from other distinctive signs – primarily trademarks – because of the
special relationship between the location from which the products originate
and the overall characteristics of the products. In 1958, the definition of
“appellations of origin” in the Lisbon Agreement codified this notion in
Article 2(1), which reads that “appellations of origin” are the “geographical
name[s] of a country, region, or locality, which serve to designate a product
originating therein, the quality and characteristics of which are due exclusively
or essentially to the geographical environment, including natural and human
90 Calboli, In Territorio Veritas, supra note 8, at 62–63.
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factors.”91 Article 2(2) of the Lisbon Agreement further clarified that
“[t]he country of origin is the country whose name, or the country in which
is situated the region or locality whose name, constitutes the appellation of
origin which has given the product its reputation.”92
Certainly, despite its strong emphasis on the “geographical environment,” the
very language of the Lisbon Agreement already reflected some flexibility in the
definition of “appellations of origin.” Notably, Article 2(1) does not impose an
“exclusive” connection between the products and the land, but just an “exclusive
or essential” connection. Moreover, the definition in Article 2(1) adds “human
factors” to “natural factors” with reference to the “exclusive or essential” elements
of the products’ quality or characteristics. As supported by prominent scholars,
reference to human factors may be seen as evidence to support a system of GI
protection focused on localities as the place not only where products are grown
but also where the products aremade, possible with ingredients and rawmaterials
partially originating from outside the region. Last, but not least, the Lisbon
Agreement also refers to the notion of product “reputation,” a concept later
found in TRIPS, even though the combined reading of Article 2(1) and 2(2)
indicates that the use of the wording “reputation” in Lisbon is a narrow one,
meaning primarily that protectable appellations of origin are the names of those
geographical locations that have given reputation to a certain product coming
from those locations. As explained in the remainder of this section, the concept of
“reputation” has later emerged as an (almost) independent justification for
protecting GIs today – a tendency that Dev Gangjee explores in this volume
based on both a “geography” and “history” approach.
Still, the major loosening of the definition of GIs away from a strict
interpretation of the notion of “geographical origin” was the direct result of
the adoption of TRIPS in 1994. Notably, Article 22(1) of TRIPS blends the
concept of terroir – in its romantic interpretation as absolute relationship
between the products and the land – with a much wider concept of “reputa-
tion” compared to the concept in the Lisbon Agreement. In particular,
Article 22(1) of TRIPS defines GIs as “indications which identify a good as
originating in the territory . . . or a region or locality in that territory, where
a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially
attributable to its geographical origin.”93 In other words, the provision in
91
1958 Lisbon Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2(1) (emphasis added). 92 Id. art. 2(2).
93 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 22(1). The definition in TRIPS was certainly influenced by WIPO’s
definition of GIs as “sign[s] used on goods that have a specific geographical origin and possess
qualities, reputation or characteristics that are essentially attributable to that origin.” World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), What is a Geographical Indication? www.wipo
.int/geo_indications/en/ (last visited August 22, 2016).
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TRIPS makes of the linkage between products and the land just an “essen-
tial” and no longer an “exclusive or essential” element for GI protection.
This loosening of “geographical accuracy” in the TRIPS’ definition of GIs is
exacerbated by the fact that TRIPS includes the notion of “reputation” front
and center in the definition of GIs, treating “reputation” as an equally
significant element for GI protection as the other characteristics and quali-
ties of the GI-denominated products. In other words, following TRIPS,
producers in a given region are able to claim exclusive rights on the geo-
graphical names of the region with respect to their products even though the
products may be manufactured with ingredients entirely originating from
outside the region, simply because the name of the region has, historically,
been linked with the products and has given to the products their reputation
(most likely because the products were first made, or became famous when
they were made, in the region).
As I mentioned in the Introduction, it is a known fact that the language of
Article 22(1) of TRIPS was heavily influenced by the language of the existing EU
Regulations at the time of the TRIPS negotiations, and that the EU strongly
supported this language. Notably, Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2081/92
of July 14, 1992, on the protection of GIs and designations of origin for agricul-
tural products and foodstuffs94 protected two different types of GIs: “geographi-
cal indications” (PGIs), which were defined as “the name[s] of a region,
a specific place or, in exceptional cases, a country, used to describe an agricul-
tural product or a foodstuff” that are “originating in that region, specific place or
country” and “which possess a specific quality, reputation or other character-
istics attributable to that geographical origin and the production and/or proces-
sing and/or preparation of which take place in the defined geographical area”;95
and “designations of origin” (PDOs), which were defined as “the name[s] of
a region . . . used to describe an agricultural product or a foodstuff” that are
“originating in that region, specific place or country” and “the quality or
characteristics of which are essentially or exclusively due to a particular geogra-
phical environment with its inherent natural and human factors, and the
production, processing and preparation of which take place in the defined
geographical area.”96 For the latter type of GIs, the PDOs, a stronger link with
the territory was required under EU law, but that was not the case for PGIs.
Moreover, Regulation No. 20181/92 provided that “certain geographical
94 Council Regulation 2081/92 of July 14, 1992 on the Protection of Geographical Indications and
Designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, 1992 O.J. (L 208) 1, [herein-
after Regulation 2081/92].
95 Id. art. 2(2)(b). 96 Id. art. 2(2)(a).
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designations shall be treated as designations of origin where the rawmaterials of
the products concerned come from a geographical area larger than or different
from the processing area.”97Regulation 2081/92was later amended and replaced,
but today’s Council Regulation (EC) No. 1151/2012 (Agricultural Products and
Foodstuff Regulation)98 and Council Regulation (EC) No. 479/2008 (Wine
Regulation)99 repeat almost verbatim the same definitions for PGIs and PDOs.
Council Regulation (EC) No. 119/2008 (Spirits Regulation) only refers to
“geographical indications” for spirits.100Despite their differences in the require-
ments to qualify as PGIs or PDOs, both types of GIs enjoy the same level of
(enhanced) protection in the EU.
Besides the influence of the EU Regulations on the definition in TRIPS,
in May 2015, a provision blending Article 22(1) of TRIPS and the EU defini-
tions was introduced into the Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement,101 which
amends the definition in Article 2(1) of the Lisbon Agreement. In particular,
similar to EU law, the Geneva Act definition now includes two types of GIs,
namely “geographical denominations” and “geographical indications.” More
specifically, Article 2(1) of the Geneva Act defines (i) geographical “denomi-
nations” as signs which “designate a good as originating in that geographical
area, where the quality or characteristics of the good are due exclusively or
essentially to the geographical environment, including natural and human
factors, and which has given the good its reputation”;102 and (ii) geographical
“indications” as signs which “consist of or contain the name of a geographical
area, or another indication known as referring to such area, which
identifies a good as originating in that geographical area, where a given
quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable
to its geographical origin.”103 In this respect, Article 2(1)(i) of the Geneva Act
97 Id. art. 2(4). The provision put the following conditions: “provided that: the production area of
the raw materials is limited; special conditions for the production of the raw materials exist,
and there are inspection arrangements to ensure that those conditions are adhered to.”
98 Regulation 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of November 21, 2012, on
Quality Schemes for Agricultural Products and Foodstuff, 2012 O.J. (L 343) 1, art. 5(1)–(3).
99 Council Regulation 479/2008 of April 29, 2008, on the Common Organization of the Market in
Wine, Amending Regulations 1493/1999, 1782/2003, 1290/2005, 3/2008 and Repealing Regulations
(EEC) No 2392/86 and 1493/1999, 2008 O.J. (L 148) 1, art. 34(1)(a)–(b). In addition, art. 31(1)(c)
includes in the definition of “designation” certain “traditional used names” provided that “(a)
designate a wine; (b) refer to a geographical name; (c) meet the requirements referred to in
paragraph 1(a)(i) to (iv) [of Article 34(1)(a)]; (d) undergo the [relevant] procedure conferring
protection on designations of origin and geographical indications.”
100 Regulation 110/2008, of the European Parliament and of the Council of January 15, 2008, on the
Definition, Description, Presentation, Labeling and the Protection of Geographical Indications
of Spirits Drinks and Repealing Council Regulation (EEC) 1576/89, 2008O.J. (L 39) 16, art. 15.
101 Geneva Act, supra note 3, art. 2. 102 Id. art. 2(1)(i). 103 Id. art. 2(1)(ii).
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merges the language of Article 2(1) and 2(2) of the Lisbon Agreement, adding
to the definition of “geographical denomination” (previously “appellations of
origin”) the wording “which has given the product its reputation.”104 Article 2(1)
(ii) repeats the TRIPS and EU definition for “geographical indications,” and
refers to “reputation” as an element sufficient, per se, for granting exclusive
rights on GIs.105 Article 2(2) of the Geneva Act then enlarges the scope of the
definition even more in Article 2(1) by defining “geographical area” as poten-
tially also “the entire territory of the Contracting Party of Origin [thus a whole
country] or a region, locality or place in the Contracting Party of Origin.”106
This area can now consist also “of a trans-border geographical area, or a part
thereof.”107
In summary, the review of the development of the current definition of GIs
directly reflects a far less stringent relationship between GI products and the
terroir than the one that is often purported in the GI debate. This review shows,
in particular, a progressive loosening of this linkage, at least in terms of the
dependence of the products from the physical and natural resources of the GI
regions. It also shows the rising importance of the human factors, traditionally
a partially less relevant element in the GI debate compared to the physical and
natural resources, as a qualifying element per se for claiming exclusive rights
on geographical names. More problematically, it empowers national autho-
rities to grant GI rights based simply on the reputational link between products
and geographical names. Not surprisingly, the loosening of the strictness of
this territorial linkage matches changes in international trade, including trade
facilitations and a larger access to raw materials from foreign markets at
reduced, or no longer existent, tariff barriers. Under the current system, GI
producers could have the best of both worlds – claiming exclusive rights on
famous locations that grant a competitive advantage to their products against
competitors on the one side, and the possibility of accessing cheaper raw
materials in foreign markets, if not cheaper human factor, at least in part, for
processed GI products, including handcrafts and artisanal goods. Hence, this
system no longer accurately identifies the geographical origin of the GI
products nor fulfills the functions that are at the core of GI protection:
104 Id. art. 2(1)(i). 105 Id. art. 2(1)(ii).
106 Id. art. 2(2).
107 Geneva Act, supra note 3, art. 2(2). This option could resolve several ongoing disputes
between neighboring countries over the origin of certain products, such as Basmati rice or
Emmentaler cheese. See Basmati, Registration No. 4076214 (India); Emmentaler Tradition
Switzerland, Registration No. 583659 (S.Z.); Allgäuer Emmentaler, Dossier No. DE/PDO/
0017/0459 (Germany); Emmental de Savoie, Dossier No. FR/PGI/ 0017/0179 (France).
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incentivizing local and rural development, and offering accurate information
to consumers.
As I mentioned before, the protection of GIs – well-knownGIs in particular –
certainly offers an important legal alternative in a world in which agricultural
subsidies, and other trade subsidies, are increasingly scrutinized as barriers to
international trade. In this respect, GIs permit producers to continue to secure
some “monopoly rent” against competing products in the international
market.108 Not surprisingly, the loosening of the definitions of GIs has been
supported precisely by those nations and stakeholders representing GI-
intensive countries and industries, such as the EU. Yet, this begs the following
question: is this “modern” system of GI protection compatible with the
historical objectives of this protection? Moreover, under the current system,
the blame and shame for any problems related to products not fully originating
from GI-denominated regions may be erroneously passed on to other GI
producers, including those who entirely produce their products in the GI-
denominated area. Ultimately, as I elaborate in the following section, this
modern system of protection could be made compatible with the traditional
objectives of GI protection, should GI producers clearly disclose the actual
geographical origin of the raw materials, product ingredients, and manufac-
turing steps that do not originate from the GI region. This is of particular
importance to, and thus should interest, developing countries in Asia-Pacific
and elsewhere, as these countries are strong producers, and exporters, of
(mostly agricultural) raw materials and non-processed products, which are,
or could be, used by other countries’ producers.
5 full disclosure required: the case for a system
of protection based on a more flexible, but still
accurate, notion of “geographical origin”
Based on the considerations in Section 4, it is not an exaggeration to state that
the system of GI protection that is currently being embraced by TRIPS and
other relevant international agreements and national legislations directly
favors a flexible notation of “geographical origin,” which does not necessarily
include the origin of all the ingredients and steps of manufacturing that are
used and needed for the production of the GI products. In this respect,
criticisms by GI skeptics exposing the inconsistency between this reality and
the arguments put forward by GI supporters that GI deserves special
108 See Justin Hughes,Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: The Spirited Debate About Geographical
Indications, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 345 (2006).
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protection because of the linkage between the products and the terroir are thus
well taken. Still, these criticisms should not let us lose sight of the actual and
potential benefits that a system of GI protection which is focused on accurate
information, can otherwise bring to both consumers and local development.
Moreover, we should not forget that the criticisms expressed against GI
protection often derive from supporters of an anti-GI agenda, an agenda that
frequently aims to protect the national interests of businesses that use (misus-
ing them in the view of this author) foreign GIs to identify their generic
national products – frequently adding to the packaging of these products
additional misleading elements, such as flags, national symbols, and color
schemes reminiscent of the foreign countries from where the GIs originate
and that are famous for their GI products.
Ultimately, as the contributions to this volume illustrate from a variety of
different angles, as much as GI protection favors a certain set of interests –
those of localities with strong agricultural or artisanal traditions and the
businesses in these localities that grow or manufacture products related to
these traditions – the lack of appropriate GI protection favors another set of
interests – those of businesses producing similar products to be sold under
names that are similar to the existing geographical names even though the
products do not share any geographical link with those locations. Disputes
over terms like Budweiser, Champagne, or Parma between business inter-
ests in different countries are illustrious examples of these conflicting
interests.109 Accordingly, the arguments put forward by GI skeptics should
also be carefully vetted as these argumentsmay also not offer optimal solutions for
consumers and (national and/or local) economic development. For example, in
some instances, the use of GI names in unrelated contexts in different countries
does indeed derive fromdecades of usage by immigrant communities, or is due to
the fact that the GI terms have indeed become generic terms in those countries.
In this case, specific exceptions should be, and generally have been, carved out
with legal solutions. Hence, these cases are less frequent than GI skeptics tend to
purport. In contrast, in several cases, the inappropriate use of GIs by third parties
in foreign countries seems to be done with the specific intent to exploit the
association generated by these terms with certain (famous) foreign geographical
places in order to create a sense of déjà vu and reassurance in consumers,
especially in other jurisdictions where these “GI look-alike” products compete
with authentic GI products. This is certainly the case with respect to the names of
many cheeses available in the market in New World countries today.
109 See Calboli, In Territorio Veritas, supra note 8, at 66.
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Still, despite these flaws in the arguments of GI skeptics, a more rigorous
interpretation of the notion of “geographical origin,” one that better com-
plies with the normative objectives that have been traditionally invoked to
justify GI protection, is nevertheless needed to restore legitimacy in the
arguments supported by GI advocates in favor of GI protection, especially
when these arguments are used to request that other countries agree to adopt
additional protection beyond the level currently provided for in TRIPS.
As I mentioned earlier and have also argued in my previous scholarship,110
in the absence of a considerable “refocus” toward greater geographical
accuracy (i.e., toward a system in which GIs effectively convey accurate
information about products’ geographical origin), GI protection may
become nothing more than a monopoly (and more problematically one
not limited in time) on geographical names for possibly no other sound
reasons than the historical reputation of a certain location. In this case,
however, GI protection no longer brings about the benefits that commu-
nities had hoped for in terms of local development – as part of the products
would be made outside the regions. Likewise, the use of GIs may result in
increasing, rather than decreasing, the information asymmetries between
producers and consumers as to the actual origin and quality of the products
at issue. In other words, from badges of geographical origin and associated
characteristics, GIs may become just badges of misleading information to
induce consumers to believe that products originate from a region, even
though, in practice, the ingredients may originate, at least in part, else-
where, or simply badges of a reputation that is associated to a location only
based on past traditions which no longer exist.
In a previous article, in 2014,111 I argued in support of the adoption of
a narrower and more geographically coherent definition of GIs to resolve
the risks of geographical inaccuracy, or inconsistency, which may plague the
current system of GI protection. This narrower approach, I argued, could be
based on limiting the granting of GI protection only to those products that are
actually grown in the GI regions, or effectively originate from these regions
with respect to the entirety of the ingredients and manufacturing steps neces-
sary tomanufacture the finished products. To reach this result, I suggested that
one option could be to delete the wording “reputation” from Article 22(1) of
TRIPS, and with it the possibility to grant exclusive rights on GIs just based on
the “reputation” of the GI products without any additional link to the actual
quality and characteristics of these products. Likewise, I suggested the removal
110 Id. at 63–66. 111 Id.
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of the word “essentially” from the definition of GIs in Article 22(1), so that GIs
would be defined as “indications which identify a good as originating in the
territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given
quality, or other characteristic of the good, is attributable to its geographical
origin.”112 Alternatively, I suggested the introduction into TRIPS’ definition in
Article 22(1) the wording “essentially or exclusively” as in the 1958 version of
the Lisbon Agreement.113 In my opinion, this language would better reflect
a very high level of geographical connection between the products and the GI-
denominated areas. Today, in light of the 2015 Geneva Act of the Lisbon
Agreement, this proposal should include amending the new definition in the
Geneva Act discussed in Section 4, as this definition has been modeled
after TRIPS.
However, as I already acknowledged in 2014, amending TRIPS is likely
to be an impossible task today, due to the current gridlocking of trade
negotiations within the WTO and the collapse of the Doha multilateral
agenda.114 Moreover, many countries have implemented a definition of
GIs similar to TRIPS, thus any amendment of TRIPS should be followed
by the amendments of these national laws. This would certainly result
in an equally complex, if not again an impossible, task to achieve in
practice.
Still, a perhaps less radical but effective proposal for a refocus of the current
system of GI protection toward a system based on a stricter territorial linkage
and more transparent disclosure of the geographical origin of the products
may nonetheless be possible under the current framework. In particular, after
further thinking and discussing this issue, I have reached the conclusion that
the key for such a solution lies in interpreting the definition of Article 22(1) in
light of the provision in Article 22(2) of TRIPS, which forbids any misleading
use of a GI and states that “interested parties” are entitled to oppose “(a) the
use of any means in the designation or presentation of a good that indicates or
suggests that the good in question originates in a geographical area other than
the true place of origin in a manner which misleads the public as to the
geographical origin of the goods.”115 As noted in Section 2, this provision
provides the minimum protection for all GIs against misleading uses. Yet,
nothing in the language of the provision seems to indicate that only GI
producers can invoke Article 22(2) to oppose the misleading use of GIs by
third parties. Instead, the provision clearly applies to all misleading use of
a GI. This may include all the cases in which GI producers use a GI to identify
products that do not fully originate from the region, should the public believe
112 Id. 113 Id. 114 Id. 115 TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 22(2).
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that the products entirely originate from the region. In other words, this may
include the cases in which GI producers turn to ingredients or raw materials,
or partially prepare the products with labor from outside the region, and do not
disclose these facts to consumers who purchase the products believing that
they originate in their entirety from the region.
Thus, based on the assumption that Article 22(2) of TRIPS could be invoked
also to prohibit the misleading use of GIs by GI producers, a solution that
could potentially address the geographical inaccuracy, or inconsistency, and
the (at least partial) lack of transparency of the current system could be the
following: GI producers could be required to clearly disclose the actual
geographical origin of any raw materials, ingredients, and manufacturing
steps of the products that do not originate from the GI region at the point of
sale and on the packaging of their products.
In particular, Article 22(2) of TRIPS could be interpreted as providing
that, should producers not disclose this information to consumers in
a transparent and explicit manner, GI producers may then be held accoun-
table for using GIs “in a manner which misleads the public as to the
geographical origin of the goods” and thus denied the right to use the said
GIs. To the contrary, when producers disclose the actual origin of any raw
materials, ingredients, and manufacturing steps of the products that do not
originate from the GI region, they would be seen as complying both with
Articles 22(1) and 22(2) of TRIPS, or more precisely their equivalent provi-
sions in the national jurisdictions where the GIs are registered and/or
protected. In practice, information about the quality and actual origin of
the ingredients and rawmaterials used for the products may already be listed
in the product specification, even though it is unclear if national laws
require such disclosure as a requirement for registering GIs.116 Moreover,
consumers rarely consult product specifications, if they are aware of the
existence of these specifications at all. Instead, consumers generally rely on
the information that they can find directly on the product packaging and
116 For example, the specification of the PDO “Prosciutto di Parma” permits that the pigs used
for the final products, the Parma ham, originate from outside the Parma region, precisely
from eleven different regions of Italy. Notably, “[t]he rawmaterial comes from a geographical
area that is larger than the production area, and which includes the administrative districts of
the following Italian Regions: Emilia-Romagna, Veneto, Lombardy, Piedmont, Molise,
Umbria, Tuscany, Marche, Abruzzo and Lazio (Italy).” See Specification and Dossier
Pursuant to Article 4 of Council Regulation 2081/92 of July 14, 1992, on the Protection of
Geographical Indications and designations of Origin for Agricultural Products and
Foodstuffs, 1992 O.J. (L 208) 6, www.prosciuttodiparma.com/pdf/en_UK/disciplinare.28.11
.2013.en.pdf.
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advertising.117 Accordingly, by requiring producers to fully disclose the
geographical origin of raw materials, ingredients, and manufacturing steps
on the packaging on the products and related product advertising consu-
mers would be made aware of the actual origin of all these various compo-
nents. This not only would allow consumers to make better informed
purchasing decisions; it would also incentivize GI producers to select
materials, ingredients, and human factors of a quality on par with the
reputation of the products, lest consumers may no longer purchase the GI
products.
Equally relevant, this obligation could benefit the producers in the local-
ities from which the raw material ingredients originate, or the workers that
provide some of the manufacturing steps of the products. Today, these produ-
cers and workers disappear in the production chain of the GI products, and
their work is not at all recognized even though their role in the final quality,
and the overall success of the products, cannot be overstated – simply put,
there would not be Swiss chocolate without cocoa beans from cocoa planta-
tions that are certainly not located in Switzerland.118 This observation is of
particular importance for countries that are primarily producers and exporters
of agricultural products, and in particular for developing countries, including
developing countries in Asia-Pacific – many of which have registered GIs for
agricultural products.119 As noted also in a 2013 study, raw materials command
a much lower premium price than finished products in general,120 and in
countries whose GIs are primarily agricultural and raw-materials-based, GI
117 See, e.g., Annette Kur,Quibbling Siblings: Comments to Dev Gangjee’s Presentation, 82 CHI.-
KENT. L. REV. 1317, 1320–321 (2007) (noting “[a]s most of us are laymen in the field, we have
to trust the competent authorities to do their job correctly” and that “the informing effects that
protected GIs have on consumers resulting from the fact that the products bear, in addition to
the GI itself, the indications ‘PDO’ . . ., ‘PGI’ . . ., or their equivalents in other languages-
appear modest at best”).
118 Ammini Ramachandran, Indian Cocoa Grown for Swiss Chocolate, ZESTER DAILY (June 21,
2012), http://zesterdaily.com/agriculture/indian-cocoa-grown-for-swiss-chocolate/ (stating that
Swiss Chocolat Noir is made from cocoa from Kerala, India). Kaspar Meuli, Facing Cocoa
Shortage, Swiss Chocolate Makes Aim to Boost African Production, WORLDCRUNCH
(January 2, 2012), http://www.worldcrunch.com/business-finance/facing-cocoa-shortage-swis
s-chocolate-makers-aim-to-boost-african-production (stating that “[m]ore than half of the
cacao beans transformed into chocolate in Switzerland come from [Ghana]”).
119 An analysis of the GIs that are registered in ASEAN indicates that a large part of these GIs
comprises of agricultural products, such as pineapples, rice, sugar coffee, tea, etc. SeeASEAN
GI DATABASE, www.asean-gidatabase.org (last visited August 22, 2016).
120
ARETÉ, supra note 86, at 6 (this study was commissioned by the EU Commission and proves,
with data, that “[a]s for agricultural raw materials, price premiums for raw materials for GI
productionwere very limited or absent in themajority of cases. Significant price premiums forGI
production over standard production were observed in less than one third of the cases”).
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producers do not seem to receive a fair share from the current GI system
compared to the producers of fully developed GI products. Instead, processed
products, like wine and cheese, tend to enjoy higher premium prices over
competing products, even when they are made, in part, with foreign ingredi-
ents – again the case of Swiss chocolate is on point.121 In this respect, a more
transparent system of GI protection requiring full disclosure would both be
compatible with the current language of TRIPS and make a stronger case in
support of GI protection everywhere.
6 conclusion
This chapter highlighted how the debate over GI protection remains
controversial under multiple fronts. Notably, as the title of this volume
summarizes, GIs are today at a crossroads between trade, development, and
culture-related interests. In particular, this chapter illustrated how the GI
debate, and related controversy, continues to dominate international trade
negotiations – at this time no longer (or not only) under the umbrella of the
WTO, but primarily as a topic addressed in bilateral and multilateral FTAs.
Moreover, attention to GIs is no longer just a “European thing,” even
though the EU has largely built its trade negotiations’ agenda over obtain-
ing protection, or enhancing the existing protection, for its GIs. Instead,
many countries outside the EU, including in Asia-Pacific, have turned their
attention to GIs and implemented national systems of GI protection driven
by the beliefs (and hopes) that this could promote local development as
well as assist marketing their products in the global market. Hence, this
chapter has also highlighted that GIs do not represent, per se, a magic tool
for local development. Thus, a wise development strategy should always
include strict quality control protocols, long-term plans to maintain pro-
duct quality, and thoughtful marketing strategies.
While highlighting the economic benefits of GI protection, this chapter
also emphasized that GIs should not become pure marketing tools for GI
producers. In this respect, it argued that the current definition of GIs has
drifted toward a looser linkage between GIs and their historical justification:
the territorial linkage between the products and the regions. Notably, GI
protection today extends to products that only “essentially” originate from GI-
denominated regions, which permit producers to partially (or mostly) out-
source the raw materials, ingredients, or manufacturing steps of GI products,
and still enjoy exclusive rights on the GI names. This chapter criticized this
121 See supra note 118.
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development as not being in line with the normative justifications for GI
protection and possibly a violation of Article 22(2) of TRIPS. Instead, this
chapter supported a narrower definition of GIs to reflect a closer linkage with
the terroir, with this link implemented in the form of a requirement that GI
producers disclose the actual origin of all the raw materials, ingredients, and
manufacturing steps of the GI products to consumers at the point of sale, and
on the product packaging and advertising. This requirement is compatible,
and perhaps even mandated, under a sensible interpretation of Article 22(2) of
TRIPS, and would benefit a more transparent system of GI protection, both to
the advantage of producers – GI producers and the producers of the foreign
materials, ingredients, and labor of GI products – and consumers.
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